Just last week, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Mine Safety and Health Administration’s broad interpretation of a “mine” by concluding that an off-site trucking facility was subject to MSHA’s jurisdiction.
How Did We Get Here?
KC Transport is an independent trucking company that offers hauling services for mining and other companies. The company operated a maintenance facility in Emmet, West Virginia, for its haul trucks approximately one mile from one of its client’s active mine sites. An MSHA inspector visited the facility after inspecting a nearby mine and observed two haul trucks undergoing maintenance. Both trucks were raised and unblocked from motion, and an individual was standing underneath one of the raised trucks. Based on these observations, the inspector issued KC Transport citations for the alleged violations.
KC Transport contested the citations and argued that MSHA lacked jurisdiction over its facility and the trucks parked there. The Administrative Law Judge held that MSHA had jurisdiction over the facility because it was properly considered a “mine” and the trucks were equipment “used in” mining-related activity under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. KC Transport appealed that ruling to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, which held that no facility or truck used in mining could be considered a “mine” under the Mine Act unless it was located at an extraction site or was a road appurtenant thereto. Because KC Transport’s facility was offsite, neither the facility nor the trucks could be considered a “mine,” and the Commission therefore vacated the citations.
The Secretary of Labor then petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for review. In 2023, the Court determined that the term “mine,” as used in the Mine Act, was ambiguous and that such ambiguity would typically warrant deference to the Secretary’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But the Court reasoned that the Secretary had failed to address several “textual clues” that undermined her position, and the Court therefore vacated and remanded the Commission’s decision to allow the Secretary the opportunity to address the ambiguous text.
KC Transport then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Not long after, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron, granted KC Transport’s petition, vacated the D.C. Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further consideration under the new standard set forth in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 411-12 (2024).
The D.C. Circuit’s Ruling
On reconsideration, the Court analyzed the Secretary’s position within the context of Loper Bright’s direction to “exercise [our] independent judgment,” employing “the traditional tools of statutory construction . . . to resolve statutory ambiguities” and determine “whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.” The case turned on whether the facility or the trucks constituted a “mine” under the Mine Act. The Court ultimately determined that the facility itself was properly considered a mine and therefore did not address whether the trucks themselves also fit the definition.
Beginning with the definition of a “mine,” the Court reasoned that the Mine Act, specifically § 802(h)(1), defined three categories: (1) an extraction site, under subsection (A); (2) any “private ways and roads appurtenant to” that extraction site, under subsection (B); and (3) the places, “facilities,” and items “used in,” “to be used in,” or “resulting from” the work of extraction, milling, or preparation of minerals, under subsection (C). The Court concluded that the determination of the case concerned the jurisdictional reach of the third category.
The Court rejected KC Transport’s argument for locational limitations to the definition, instead deciding that a facility does not have to be next to or on an actual extraction, milling, or preparation site when the facility is “necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing coal.” But the Court also admitted that the Mine Act does not provide clarity as to the extent of MSHA’s jurisdiction. Despite acknowledging the frustration that operators were likely to experience, the Court declined to offer any further clarity on the issue.
In further support that the facility was “necessarily connected,” the Court also noted that the trucking facility was less than 1,000 feet from the mine operator’s private haul road, was constructed there with the mine operator’s permission, performed a majority of its services for the mine operator, and that the subject trucks were exclusively operated on the mine operator’s haul road, extraction sites, and preparation plant. These additional facts therefore made this decision “easy” for the Court.
What Does the KC Transport Decision Mean for Operators?
This case has been closely watched by the mining industry since its inception in 2019, with fears that it could drastically expand MSHA’s jurisdiction over vehicles and other equipment. And while the Court did affirm MSHA’s jurisdiction in this case, the Court focused much more closely on the nature of the trucking facility itself, rather than the trucks or other equipment involved.
Still, the decision should caution operators/employers as to the extent and nature of their operations, especially for those that provide services to mining operations. Significantly, the Court identified that a majority—nearly 60%—of KC Transport’s services were for the mine operator and that the trucks operated exclusively on mine property. Moving forward, if your operation provides services to mining operations, you should be aware that MSHA could be able to assert jurisdiction over your facility, especially if it appears as integrated as KC Transport.
If you have any questions how the decision in KC Transport could affect your operations, please reach out to a member of the Jackson Kelly Workplace Safety and Health Team today. We are continuing to monitor this and other developments as they occur.